NRC Reports Highlight Safety Failures at Indian Point
May 19, 2011
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
- IP2 and 3 - Station blackout and seismic – NRC does not require Indian Point to plan for a loss of offsite electrical power to the plant caused by an earthquake (IP3 report pg. 12)
- IP2 and 3 - Fire protection systems in ‘non safety related’ buildings, including city make up water, are not seismically designed, and would likely not withstand even a ‘Safe Shutdown Earthquake” (SSE). (IP2 report pg. 13, IP3 report pg. 12)
- IP 2- Entergy hasn’t tested its hydrogen recombiners since 2006, and can’t show that they’re operable. This is equipment designed to reduce hydrogen buildup during an accident, to avoid the kind of explosions that occurred at Fukushima.(IP2 report, page 2)
- IP2 - Entergy failed to inspect the Hudson River water intake structure, including the service water pump bays, as required by NRC regulations (service water pumps are critical equipment needed to cool the reactors and spent fuel pools after an accident or loss of electrical power.) It hasn’t been inspected in 5 years, and no inspection is scheduled.
- IP3 - CO2 fire extinguisher tanks do not have to meet any seismic standards –earthquake damage could mean losing these systems for critical areas like the turbine building, emergency diesel generator rooms, and electrical switching rooms.
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